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BACK WHERE YOU BELONG: INDIVIDUALS,
CORPORATIONS, AND THE THIRD
CIRCUIT'S REDEFINITION OF
PERSONAL PRIVACY UNDER FOIA
By: Emily A. Schneider
ABSTRACT

The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA" or "the Act") serves an important purpose in informing the citizenry of its government's actions. Congress
created it as a disclosure statute, the Supreme Court has decided FOJA in
favor of disclosure, and the D. C. Circuit has kept that goal of disclosure by
refusing to broaden its exemptions. Despite this history of consistent treatment, the Third Circuit attempted to change the game with its holding in
AT&T v. FCC. The Third Circuit held that corporationsmay have personal
privacy under FOIA Exemption 7(C). This paper will argue that this holding
contradicted three FOIA principles established by Supreme Court decisions:
(1) broad disclosure, narrow exemptions; (2) creating practical, workable
standards;and (3) using Exemption 7(C) to protect the unique privacy interests of individuals. The manner of the Third Circuit's decision also created
additional problems in interpretation and application of Exemption 7(C).
Though overruled in the instant case, the Third Circuit's decision-making
demonstrates a disregardfor FOIA principles that could create problems in
future cases.
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INTRODUCTION

"One of these things is not like the other; one of these things just
doesn't belong."' Anyone under a certain age or with a child under a
certain age could probably finish that song. It is from a segment on
the children's show Sesame Street.2 The camera shows four items and
the lyrics exhort the viewer to identify the item that does not belong
by the time the song is finished.' Like most of the lessons from Sesame Street, they are useful into adulthood. Given the grouping of Willow Canyon Homeowners Association; Bass Industries, Inc.; a pick-up
basketball team; and John Wayne, one would surmise that John
Wayne does not belong with the other items because he is a human,
whereas the other three are groups of humans formed into specific
entities. But given different criteria, the odd-one-out can change.
Pick-up basketball teams do not reach the level of structure and permanency that one would consider typical of an organization.' For this
reason, the basketball team would not fit into the statutory definition
of a person under 5 U.S.C. § 551, whereas the other three entities in
that grouping would.' The law often makes distinctions like this
whether they comport with one's usual sense of categorization or not.6
Even these legal categorizations do not remain constant. Though a
statute groups an individual together with corporations and associations, courts have distinguished individuals from the others in the case
of personal privacy under the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"
or "the Act").7 By singling out individuals, courts have denied the
protection of personal privacy to corporations and businesses.' This
changed in 2009 when the Third Circuit issued its opinion in AT&T v.
FCC, giving AT&T the FOIA protection of personal privacy. This
Comment will argue that this decision was incorrect because it violated the principles established by the Supreme Court in a line of
cases spanning over thirty years and because the Third Circuit's hold1. Videos: One of These Things, SESAME STREET, http://www.sesamestreet.org/
video player/-/pgpy/videoplayer/0/878bf0b6-aac-4030-98d0-6fbe5704f0ff/one-of_
these-things (last visited Sept. 3, 2011).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See Organization Definition, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-web-

ster.com/dictionary/organization (last visited Sept. 3, 2011) (defining organization as
an "association" or "society," or as "an administrative and functional structure").
5. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2006) (defining person
to include "an individual, partnership, corporation, association or public or private
organization other than an agency").
6. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 68(a) (2006); 7 U.S.C. § 3402(1) (2006); 7 U.S.C. § 75(c)
(2006) (defining person to include individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, other entities, or business enterprises).
7. See U.S. Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982); Multi AG
Media LLC v. Dep't of Agric., 515 F.3d 1224, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Campaign for
Family Farms v. Glickman, 200 F.3d 1180,1189 (8th Cir. 2000); Nat'l Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673, 685 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
8. See Multi AG Media, 515 F.3d at 1228.
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ing would have created new problems to be solved by both the courts
and the administrative agencies that operate under FOIA daily.

II. AT&T

v. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS

A.

COMMISSION

Background

The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") administered a
federal program called "E-Rate" to give schools more access to advanced telecommunications technology.' AT&T participated in this
program by providing equipment and services to schools and then billing the government for the costs.'o In 2004, AT&T informed the FCC
that it may have overcharged the government for work done in the
New London, Connecticut school district." The FCC's Enforcement
Bureau ("Bureau") conducted an investigation and collected documents from AT&T such as invoices, internal e-mails providing pricing
and billing information for the New London schools, responses to Bureau interrogatories, and names of employees involved in the New
London billing. 1 2 The Bureau also received AT&T's own assessment
of whether the employees involved in the overcharging violated
AT&T's internal code of conduct."
In 2005, CompTel, a trade association representing some of AT&T's
competitors, submitted a FOIA request for the pleadings and correspondence in the Bureau's investigation file of AT&T's E-Rate billing.14 AT&T then also submitted a letter to the Bureau opposing the
request because FOIA Exemption 7(C) prohibited the disclosure of
the collected documents." The Bureau rejected AT&T's argument
because corporations do not have the personal privacy protected by
the exemption. ' 6 AT&T then filed an application for the FCC to review the Bureau's ruling.'" The FCC denied the application on procedural grounds, but on its own motion compelled disclosure because
Exemption 7(C) does not apply to corporations." AT&T then petitioned the Third Circuit to review the FCC's order; CompTel entered
the case also as an intervener."
9.
(2011).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 492 (3d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1177
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at

492.
492-93.
493.

493-94.
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The Court's Statutory Interpretation of FOIA and Holding

After dealing with the FCC's procedural arguments, the court addressed the main issue: whether corporations such as AT&T may have
personal privacy under FOIA.20 The Third Circuit found that the
plain text of Exemption 7(C) indicated that it applies to corporations.2 The exemption protects personal privacy, and FOIA defines
"person" to include a corporation.2 2 The court stated that the adjectival form should refer back to the defined term; here, FOIA defined
"personal" by defining "person." 23 Because the court found the statutory language unambiguous, it declined to consider the statutory purpose, relevant case law, and legislative history arguments set forth by
the parties. 24 The Third Circuit agreed with AT&T and held that a
corporation may have a personal privacy interest under the protection
of Exemption 7(C).2 5
III. EXISTING LAW
A.

Freedom of Information Act

In 1966, Congress passed FOIA as a revision of the public disclosure section of the Administrative Procedure Act, which fell "far short
of its disclosure goals and came to be looked upon more as a withholding statute than a disclosure statute." 26 FOIA requires federal
agencies to make certain records available for public inspection and to
make other information available to any person upon request.2 7
FOIA seeks to permit public access to official information and has "a
general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory language." 28 Congress
made these exemptions, found in 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), exclusive to establish "concrete, workable standards for determining whether particular
material may be withheld or must be disclosed." 29 The exemptions
may apply only to reasonably segregable portions of a record. After
deleting the material exempted by § 522(b), the agency may then release the remainder of the record. 30
The exemptions found in subsections 6 and 7(C) of FOIA prevent
release of information that would constitute unwarranted invasions of
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 494-96.
Id. at 497.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 498.
Id.
Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 & n.5 (1973).
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)-(3) (2006).
Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976).
Mink, 410 U.S. at 79; 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006).
Id. § 552(b).
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personal privacy.3 I Exemption 6 prohibits the dissemination of personnel and medical files when their release would "constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 3 2 Exemption 7(C) varies
in several respects. First, it concerns records or information compiled
for law enforcement purposes.3 3 Second, this exemption has a different standard: the production of the information "could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."3 4
Despite these differences, the Supreme Court has used reasoning
from an Exemption 6 opinion to determine what constitutes personal
privacy in the context of Exemption 7(C).
B.

Supreme Court FOIA Decisions

The Supreme Court has discussed the interpretation and application
of the FOIA exemptions in a variety of cases.3 6 These cases have revealed the Court's understanding of the purpose of FOIA, the narrowness of its exemptions, and the proper interpretation of these
exemptions." The Supreme Court has also described how the exemptions, especially Exemptions 6 and 7(C), relate and compare to one
another.3 8 Three principles appear repeatedly in these decisions.
First, the purpose of FOIA, namely disclosure of information to the
public, requires agencies and courts to construe the disclosure requirements broadly, the exemptions narrowly." Second, Congress intended the exemptions to set up concrete workable standards that
agencies and courts should interpret practically.40 Third, Congress intended the exemptions to prevent disclosure of information that
would infringe privacy interests of private citizens.4
1. Broad Disclosure Requirements, Narrow Exemptions
Congress created FOIA to permit greater public access to government information than previous disclosure statutes had permitted.4 2
The central purpose was to open up government activities to "the
31. Id. § 552(b)(6), (7)(C).
32. Id. § 552(b)(6).
33. Id. § 552(b)(7).
34. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
35. See U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 768 (1989).
36. See, e.g., id.; Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976);
Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
37. See Reporters, 489 U.S. at 754-56; Rose, 425 U.S. at 360-67; Mink, 410 U.S. at
79-80.
38. See Reporters, 489 U.S. at 768.
39. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1978); Rose, 425
U.S. at 366.
40. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146,157 (1989); Rose, 425 U.S.
at 381-82; Mink, 410 U.S. at 79.
41. See Reporters, 489 U.S. at 768.
42. Mink, 410 U.S. at 79.
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sharp eye of public scrutiny."4 3 In Mink, the Court stressed the Act's
own language of making information available to the public for inspection.4 4 This language places the emphasis on the "fullest responsible disclosure." 5 In Reporters Committee, the Court also recognized
that government files incidentally contain information about private
citizens and Congress did not intend the Act to disclose this second
type of information.46 For this reason, Congress "carefully structured
nine exemptions from the otherwise mandatory disclosure requirements in order to protect specified confidentiality and privacy interests." 47 In other cases, the Court stressed that the exemptions were
intended to be narrow and exclusive. 4 8 Understanding that interpretations may differ even with seemingly simple statutes, the Court recognized the possibility of confusion brought out by conflict in the
legislative history. 9 In Rose, the Supreme Court quoted, with approval, from a D.C. Circuit case that addressed legislative history.o
There, the principle purpose of FOIA in promoting disclosure required the court to choose the interpretation that most favors
disclosure. 1
2.

Exemptions Must Set Up Practical, Workable Standards

The dichotomy of broad disclosure and protecting privacy interests
could pose a problem for agencies tasked with applying FOIA. However, in John Doe, the Supreme Court recognized Congress's attempt
to balance the two with specific exemptions.52 The specificity and the
"clearly delineated statutory language" of the exemptions would inform agencies which information to not disclose.53 In Mink, the Court
described the exemptions as "plainly intended to set up concrete,
workable standards for determining whether particular material may
be withheld or must be disclosed."5 4 The Court stressed again the
practical, workable nature of the exemptions in Rose.5 1 In Rose, the
Supreme Court considered the personal privacy implications of identifying information in case summaries of service academy honor and
ethics hearings.5 6 Having determined that disclosure of the summa43. Reporters, 489 U.S. at 774.
44. Mink, 410 U.S. at 79.
45. Id. at 80.
46. Reporters, 489 U.S. at 774-75.
47. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220-21 (1978).
48. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 366 (1976); Mink, 410 U.S. at 79.
49. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 365-66.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 366.
52. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 153 (1989) (emphasis
added).
53. Rose, 425 U.S. at 360-61.
54. Mink, 410 U.S. at 79.
55. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
56. Id. at 355-57, 377.
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ries could involve invasions of privacy, the Court turned to the remedy
of redacting names and other identifying information." Recognizing
that redaction does not guarantee protection against identifiability
and that the consequences of identification are severe, the Court still
chose redaction over another remedy because of its practicability.5 8
Brennan noted that redaction was a familiar technique and Congress
intended the exemptions to be practical and workable."
3. Congress Intended to Protect the Privacy Rights of
Individual Citizens
In Whalen v. Roe and again in Reporters Committee, the Court de-

fined the concept of personal privacy as the privacy interest of an individual.60 In delivering the opinion of the Court in Whalen, Justice
Stevens described two types of privacy interests: "One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosures of personal matters, and another is
the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions."61 Justice Stevens later used a footnote to further describe the
latter interest as an individual's right to freedom from government
compulsion in "action, thought, experience, and belief." 62 In Reporters Committee, the opinion of the Court by Justice Stevens discussed
the idea of privacy and how it fit within the purpose of FOIA.6 3 He
began with the basic definition: "[B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual's control of
information concerning his or her person."6 4 He then quoted two
scholars who also defined privacy as an individual right: the right to
control how much information about him is communicated to
others.6 5 According to the opinion of Reporters, Congress also took
this approach when drafting FOIA and its exemptions. 66 The portion
of the statute which permitted agencies to redact identifying information reflected "a congressional understanding that disclosure of
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 381.
See id.
Id. at 381-82.
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S.

749, 763 (1989); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
61. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600.
62. Id. at 600 (quoting PHILLIP B. KURLAND, THE PRIVATE 1: SOME REFLECTIONS
ON PRIVACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 8 (1976)).
63. Reporters, 489 U.S. at 763-64.
64. Id. at 763.
65. Id. at 764 n.16 (quoting ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 1 (1970) ("Privacy, in my view, is the rightful claim of the individual to determine the extent to which he wishes to share of himself with others."); ALAN F.
WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7 (1967) ("Privacy is the claim of individuals . .. to

determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is
communicated to others.")).
66. Id. at 766.
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records containing personal details about private citizens can infringe
significant privacy interests." 6 7
IV.
A.

CASE ANALYSIS

The Third Circuit's decision unnecessarily broadened the
exemption beyond what Congress intended.

The Third Circuit's decision in AT&T was incorrectly decided because it violated the principles previously established by the Supreme
Court as to the purpose, scope, and interpretation of the FOIA exemptions, specifically Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Again and again, the
Supreme Court has stressed that FOIA promotes broad disclosure
which requires narrow exemptions. 68 Understanding Congress's intent to limit the amount of information protected under these exemptions, the Supreme Court had applied Exemption 7(C) only to
individuals.6 1 Opening this same exemption to corporations could exponentially increase the information kept from public discovery. A
corporation's daily operations will usually generate more information
than an individual's daily tasks. For example, an average person
might make a few phone calls to family or friends, purchase some groceries, and pick out a movie to watch. In contrast, even a mid-sized
corporation could make hundreds of phone calls per day, purchase
items by the thousands, and set up a business plan to guide operations
in several states for the next several months. Because a corporation
tends to do things on a bigger scale, it produces more information that
could potentially fit the exemption.
Additionally, the manner in which the Third Circuit expanded Exemption 7(C) to include corporations by definition also embraces several other types of organizations. The FOIA definition of a person
includes corporations, partnerships, associations, and public or private
organizations other than an agency.o The Third Circuit gave corporations the 7(C) personal privacy exemption because FOIA defined a
corporation as a person, not because characteristics of a corporation
make it deserving of a privacy-interest protection. This reasoning also
gives personal-privacy exemptions to any of the groups listed in the
definition. The Third Circuit drew no distinction between corporations and any other entity in the definition, leaving the door wide
67. Id.
68. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 366 (1976); Envtl. Prot. Agency
v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80 (1973).
69. See AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1177
(2011) (noting that the Supreme Court had not squarely rejected a proffer of personal
privacy for a corporation); see also Reporters, 489 U.S. at 762 (Exemption 7(C) privacy implicated was that of "an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters").
70. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2006).
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open for the other entities to argue for protection under this exemption by virtue of the statutory language.
The Third Circuit's decision was also incorrect because the protection of corporate information by Exemption 7(C) is a redundant safeguard. Corporations were already protected under FOIA through
Exemption 4, which protects trade secrets and privileged commercial
or financial information.7 1 Though the Third Circuit did not provide a
test for privacy in the context of a corporation, information that a corporation has kept secret or privileged would presumably fall within
the personal privacy definition as well. Without a definitive judicial
test, it is difficult to say whether any information protected by Exemption 7(C) would not also fall into the category of Exemption 4 protection. The amount of information requiring a separate shield under
7(C) is likely very limited. However, one cannot ignore the alternative that courts will find information that does not fit under Exemption 4 fits, instead, under Exemption 7(C). Giving corporations
another exemption that is separate in both title and scope doubles the
opportunity to keep information from the public. Either the new
scope of Exemption 7(C) would do nothing or it would do too much.
While a court may often find itself faced with unattractive consequences such as these, rarely did the court itself create the necessity
for these consequences. Excepting a brief discussion of corporate reputation, the court's decision spelled out how AT&T could receive
FOIA protection, not why AT&T needed this protection.
B.

The Third Circuit erred in making this decision because it
incorrectly relied only on statutory language and ignored
legislative intent and Supreme Court precedent.

For such a broad-reaching decision, the Third Circuit relied on relatively few bases for reaching its decision. The Third Circuit chose to
interpret Exemption 7(C) on statutory language alone, both the language of the exemption itself and the statutory definitions provided in
§ 551.72 Using these definitions, the court decided that the language
unambiguously included corporations in the category of entities protected by that exemption. Having made this decision, the Third Circuit then declined to consider the arguments made about statutory
purpose, other case law, and legislative history.

71. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (2006).
72. See AT&T, 582 F.3d at 497. Because language was the basis for the Third
Circuit's decision, this was also the ground on which the Supreme Court overruled the
case. AT&T v. FCC, 131 S. Ct. 1177 (2011).
73. AT&T, 582 F.3d at 498.
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1. The Third Circuit only used statutory language and one
definition found therein.
The Third Circuit looked only at the language of the FOIA exemption. The language of Exemption 7 provided protection against disclosure of records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes when it would infringe on various interests, such as the right
to a fair trial, disclosure of confidential sources, or the endangerment
of life or physical safety of an individual.74 Exemption 7(C) protects
personal privacy.75 Rather than using the common understanding of
personal privacy or using the Supreme Court's definitions mentioned
above, the Third Circuit chose to break apart the phrase to define it.7 1
The root of "personal" is "person," and § 551 defines the meaning of
the word "person" for FOIA." Despite three years earlier declining
to conclusively link an adjectival form to its statutorily-defined root,
the Third Circuit insisted that it "would be very odd indeed" for the
adjective to not refer back to the defined root term.78 The definition
of person in § 551 includes an individual, partnership, corporation, association, or public or private organization other than an agency.
Because this definition included corporations, the Third Circuit held
that the language of Exemption 7(C) unambiguously indicated that a
corporation may have personal privacy under the exemption.s0
2.

The Third Circuit ignored persuasive congressional intent as
evidenced by House Reports and clear legislative history.

Once the court made that decision, it chose to ignore the other arguments proffered by the parties, including congressional intent, legislative history, and other courts' decisions that were relevant though
not controlling.8 The Third Circuit noted that congressional intent
was evidenced through the statutory language, and only if that language was ambiguous should the courts look to legislative history.8 2
The court pointed out that legislative history has several shortcomings
as an interpretive tool, not the least of which concerns the problem of
multiple intents from the hundreds of representatives who must vote
for a bill.8 While the Third Circuit had a valid point, it cannot exclude all investigations into legislative intent. Practicality requires
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2006).

75. Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).

76. AT&T, 582 F.3d at 497.
77. Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2006).
78. AT&T, 582 F.3d at 497; see Del. River Stevedores v. DiFidelto, 440 F.3d 615,
620 (3d Cir. 2006) (the term "disabled employee" need not be linked to definitions of
"disability" and "employee").
79. § 551(2).
80. A T& T, 582 F.3d at 498.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 498 n.7.
83. Id.
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brevity, and a legislature cannot always say everything it wants to say
in the wording of the statute alone.
Actions speak louder than words, and the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act provided clear information about legislative
intent. Congress had already created a disclosure statute that would
allow the public access to information about its government.84 Called
the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress enacted this disclosure
statute in 1946.85 However, the broad exemptions within the Administrative Procedure Act prompted Congress to revise the Act in
1966.86 In the House Report created before FOIA was passed, Representative Dawson described the Administrative Procedure Act and
listed the abuses that occurred in administration of that Act.
Dawson identified three sources of improper government secrecy:
one, a "housekeeping" statute, which gave government officials general authority to operate their agencies; two, executive privilege,
which affected legislative access to executive branch information; and
three, section three of the Administrative Procedure Act. Dawson
equated the information withheld by a privilege claimed with the information withheld by a disclosure statute;8 9 this fact would reduce
the confidence one had in the efficacy of the disclosure statute. Dawson noted attempts to fix the secrecy caused by the housekeeping statute and executive privilege, but called the Administrative Procedure
Act "the major statutory excuse for withholding government records
from public view." 9 o Considering such congressional opinions of the
current disclosure statute, one does not question the steps Congress
took in creating FOIA.
Comparing the Administrative Procedure Act and FOIA, the
changes between them provide a clear road map highlighting the direction Congress chose to move within this field. While the Administrative Procedure Act required that potential requesters pass a
properly and directly concerned test, FOIA makes the majority of
records available to any person.9 ' By broadening the pool of potential
requesters, Congress broadened the release of information. Congress
also changed the language of the exemptions. The Administrative
Procedure Act provided exemptions for materials by using phrases
such as "good cause found," "in the public interest," and "internal
84. See WILLIAM DAWSON, CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE
PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 1 (1966).
85. Id.
86. See Thomas Blanton, Freedomof Informationat 40, THE NAT'L SEC. ARCHIVE
(July 4, 2006), http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/NSAEB B/NSA EBB1 94/index.htm.
87. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 1-3.
88. Id. at 2.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 2-3.
91. Id. at 1.
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management."9 2 In comparison, FOIA lists exemptions with specific
definitions, such as "specifically authorized under criteria established
by an Executive order" and "related solely to the internal personnel
rules and practices of an agency."93 An agency choosing to withhold
information would receive more deference under a standard of "in the
public interest" than under a standard requiring "criteria established
by an Executive order." Again, Congress broadened the release of
information-in this case, conversely through narrower exemptions.
Thus, by comparing the language of the statutes, one may infer a few
statements of congressional intent. This interpretation of intent does
not rely on external statements of intent from various members of the
legislature; rather, much like the Third Circuit's reasoning, it focuses
on the words of the statute.
3. The Third Circuit also rejected the Supreme Court's consistent
treatment of FOIA, as well as persuasive D.C. Circuit decisions.
The Third Circuit also declined to consider relevant decisions from
other courts.9 4 The parties discussed FOIA exemption cases, including those from the D.C. Circuit." Both the D.C. Circuit and the Supreme Court highlighted the same important facts in the legislative
history of FOIA. The previous disclosure statutes had failed to provide information to the public to the extent Congress desired.96 Congress replaced loosely-constructed exemptions with tightly-drawn
categories of exemption." In promulgating this Act, Congress set
forth a presumption of disclosure and thus, a narrow construction of
the exemptions listed.98
a.

Both the Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit stressed the
importance of narrow FOIA exemptions.

Because the courts found that Congress had created the statute with
a presumption of disclosure, they interpreted the exemptions narrowly. 9 In Washington Post, the D.C. Circuit had an opportunity to
apply Exemption 7(C) to a report dealing with an investigation into a
harmful drug.1" The corporation involved sought to protect the government report from a FOIA request based on the presence of em92. Id. at 2.
93. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(A), (2) (2006).
94. AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 498 (3d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1177
(2011).
95. Id. at 498 n.6.
96. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
97. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976); Wash. Post Co. v.
U.S. Dep't of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
98. See Rose, 425 U.S. at 361; Wash. Post, 863 F.2d at 101.
99. Rose, 425 U.S. at 360-61; Wash. Post, 863 F.2d at 101.
100. Wash. Post, 863 F.2d at 99-100.
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ployee names in the report.'o' Even though employees were named in
the report, the presence of the name did "not divulge whether the
individual was a target of any law enforcement investigation."1 0 2 The
report also contained employees' business decisions; the D.C. Circuit
again refused to protect this information on the grounds that it was
not of a private nature.10 3 Though given an opportunity to expand or,
as some might consider, simply apply the exemption, the D.C. Circuit
interpreted the exemption to a very strict sense of personal privacy.
b. The Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit decisions discussed
personalprivacy, both the type of information encompassed and the
reasons for protecting that information.
The Supreme Court and the D.C. Circuit also discussed the very
thing AT&T sought to protect in this case: the concept of personal
privacy.104 In Rose, the Supreme Court listed several intimate details
that would have constituted an invasion of personal privacy had they
been present in the files under the Court's consideration. These included an individual's birth place, his parents' names, where he has
lived from time to time, his high school or other school records, examThe D.C. Cirination results, and work performance evaluations.'
the
protection of
fall
under
would
details
that
list
of
cuit had its own
Post,
the court
In
Washington
privacy.
for
personal
an exemption
of fathers
identity
children,
of
legitimacy
listed them: "marital status,
consumpalcoholic
payments,
welfare
condition,
of children, medical
tion, family fights, and reputation."106
However, the D.C. Circuit drew the line at exemptions protecting
information connected to business judgments and relationships, even
if disclosure of this information would tarnish someone's professional
reputation.' 0 7 The court conceded an exception where the two intersect: when business records reveal financial information that one can
easily trace to an individual, disclosure of those records jeopardizes a
personal-privacy interest. 0 s This exception was discussed in a case
involving family farms, where the financial information about the
farm would reveal at least a portion of the owner's personal fi-

nances.' 0 9 Thus, the D.C. Circuit did not utilize the exception to protect the privacy of the business, but rather the privacy of the person
whose finances were mirrored by the business.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 101.
Id.
Id. at 100.
See Rose, 425 U.S. at 377; Wash. Post, 863 F.2d at 100.
Rose, 425 U.S. at 377.
Wash. Post, 863 F.2d at 100.
Id.
Multi AG Media LLC v. Dep't of Agric., 515 F.3d 1224, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Id. at 1229.

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol18/iss2/10
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V18.I2.9

14

Schneider: Back Where You Belong: Individuals, Corporations, and the Third C

2011]

BACK WHERE YOU BELONG

373

Not only have these courts listed specific examples of information
protected as personal privacy, but the courts' reasons for doing so also
shed light on the correct understanding of personal privacy. In Washington Post, the Supreme Court understood House and Senate Reports to suggest that Congress's primary purpose in enacting
Exemption 6 was to "protect individuals from the injury and embarrassment that can result from the unnecessary disclosure of personal
information.""o Similarly, the Supreme Court sought to protect families from disruption of peace of mind, additional anguish, annoyance,
or harassment that would result from release of graphic details about
a loved one's death.I'
The Third Circuit considered several of these arguments and dismissed them.' 12 It mentioned the D.C. Circuit's list of details protected as personal privacy yet ignored the exception found in the same
case as that list. The Third Circuit quoted these intimate details, including reputation, and then argued that a corporation also has a
strong interest in protecting its reputation." 3 This argument disregards the D.C. Circuit's later point that personal privacy does not extend to business judgments or relationships, even at the risk of
tarnishing a person's professional reputation." 4 If the FOIA exemptions do not protect the professional reputation of an individual (who
undoubtedly has a personal privacy interest), why would a corporation
receive that protection?
Further, determining when a corporation has suffered embarrassment, harassment, anguish, or annoyance would present a new list of
difficulties. Most, if not all, corporations put themselves out in the
public eye, which would expose them to harassment, annoyance, or
embarrassment anyway. Corporations are often required to share information with shareholders, who, in a publicly traded corporation,
could be anyone with enough money to buy a share. For example, in
South Carolina, a corporation must issue annual financial statements
to its shareholders."' 5 While a shareholder is an owner at the time the
report is received, in two or three weeks, he may be a member of the
general public again. In contrast, individuals are rarely required to
disclose personal financial information equivalent to that in a financial
statement, much less disclose that information to relative strangers. 1 16
110. U.S. Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 599 (1982).
111. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 171 (2004).
112. See AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 498 n.5 (3d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct.

1177 (2011).
113. See id. at 498 n.6.
114. Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
115. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-16-200(a) (2010).
116. The author recognizes that individuals are often required to share financial
information, for example, to run a credit check. However, the individual chooses to
apply for a line of credit that necessitates the credit check.
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Financial information, however, is one of the few types of information that has equivalence between corporations and individuals. One
must look more specifically at the type of information disclosed.
While a corporation undoubtedly has information it would rather
keep private, it is difficult to imagine that a corporation has information as intimate as an individual. What is the corporate equivalent of
alcoholic consumption or of a medical diagnosis of a sexually transmitted disease? Though a corporation has a reputation to protect, it
does not have vulnerabilities to that reputation that an individual has.
Does disclosure of a subsidiary's failure cause the same anguish as
that of publication of a child's autopsy photographs? Though a corporation may be embarrassed, it does not have the same capacity for
emotional anguish that an individual has.
C.

If left standing, this decision demolishes three FOIA principles.

Regardless of how the Third Circuit reached its decision in AT&T
v. FCC, if left standing, this decision would have demolished the three
FOIA principles set up by the language of the statute and identified
by the Supreme Court. Not only has the Supreme Court identified
these principles, but it has used them consistently and emphasized
them in multiple opinions."' This decision contradicted all of these
principles. First, it would have destroyed the rule of broad disclosure
and narrow exemptions. Second, it would have made the standards
and remedies for each exemption anything but practical and workable. And third, it would have contradicted the history of Congress
and the courts using Exemption 7(C) to protect the personal privacy
interests of individuals.
1. This decision destroyed the FOIA principle of broad disclosure
and narrow exemptions.
As previously discussed, the main FOIA principle favors disclosure
of information-that was the reason Congress felt it necessary to replace the Administrative Procedure Act with FOIA."8 Though ideally any and all information would be released to a member of the
public who requested it, other considerations require limits on this
flow of information. The exemptions should not act as a dam, but
rather a sieve. Increasing either the number of entities who may claim
an exemption or the amount of information covered by an exemption
also increases the sieving capabilities of the exemption. The Third
Circuit's decision increased both the number of entities who may
117. See Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976); Envtl. Prot.
Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
118. See WILLIAM DAWSON, CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE
PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 1-2 (1966).
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claim a personal privacy interest under Exemption 7(C) and the
amount of information that falls within that zone of privacy.
a.

The Third Circuit's decision meant that Exemption 7(C) would
cover more entities than before.

The purpose of FOIA, as emphasized by the Supreme Court and
D.C. Circuit, is to promote dissemination of information about the
government to the public. By permitting corporations to claim personal privacy, the Third Circuit broadened the exemptions available
and made more information unavailable to the public. More troublesome than the result reached are the implications of the way the court
reached its decision. Instead of analyzing the unique characteristics of
a corporation that entitle it to protection under the exemption, the
Third Circuit took a purely definitional route. In doing so, the Third
Circuit opened the door for the other entities included in the statutory
definition of person. With this decision as precedent, a personal-privacy exemption could be available for the other entities called a "person" in § 551: "a partnership, association, or public or private
organization other than an agency.""' 9 An "agency" means each authority of the United States government except for Congress, the
courts of the United States, the governments of the territories or possessions of the United States, and the government of the District of
Columbia. 12 0
Using these definitions, a public organization other than an agency
could include state and municipal governments. In City of Sausalito,
the Ninth Circuit had to determine whether the City of Sausalito had
standing to bring suit against the National Park Service. 121 Because
the statute on which the City based its claim did not explicitly provide
statutory standing, the Ninth Circuit had to look at the Administrative
Procedure Act, which provides standing for any person "adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action." 12 2 The Administrative Procedure Act uses the same definitions as FOIA, namely § 551(2).123
Using this definition of person, the court concluded that Sausalito
qualified as a person because it was a municipal corporation.12 4 If MUnicipal governments qualify under the definition, courts could also
stretch it to include other state governments or agencies.
This definition of "person" reaches far beyond cities though; it
could mean the National Football League or the Hollywood Foreign
Press Association. Any group of people, no matter how loosely associated, can organize itself somehow and then claim eligibility for pro119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Administrative Procedure Act § 1, 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (2006).
Id. § 551(1).
City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1196 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1200.
Id.
Id.
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tection under Exemption 7(C). This provides a textbook example of
the slippery slope theory. Another analysis may have limited the
damage of this decision to only a select group; however, the Third
Circuit's choice of reasoning opened the door for all of these other
groups. This broadened the exemption to the point of nullity and had
the potential to hide a larger amount of information from members of
the public.
b.

An exemption for a corporation'sprivacy interest would likely
keep a larger amount of information from disclosure,
because a corporationgenerally has a wider
reach than an individual.

First, the Third Circuit's decision contradicted the purpose of FOIA
in providing full disclosure because this holding creates an enormous
group of protected entities. This decision hacked a broad swath of
information that would be made unavailable for public viewing. Not
only did the decision broaden the amount of information protected
under a corporate application of 7(C), but it broadened this amount to
an undetermined and possibly exponential sum. Though a corporation may be small, with only a few employees and a limited number of
transactions per day, many, like AT&T, are large with thousands of
employees and thousands of transactions per day. Additionally, large
corporations will likely have more interaction with several branches of
the federal government than smaller companies may. For example, a
company like Wal-Mart sells products that fall under the authority of
the Food and Drug Administration; pays its employees, requiring interaction with the IRS; and has at least forty-three records in the
Trademark Electronic Search System.125 This is only a sample of the
possible agencies that could have interaction with a large corporation
and compile records about the corporation for investigatory purposes.
This interaction between government agencies and corporations
would create more work for both. Previously, a corporation only had
to worry about information covered by Exemption 4 (trade secrets)
and Exemption 6 (personnel files). The Third Circuit gave a corporation the option of protecting every piece of information that the government obtained from it-corporations could have monitored these
government disclosures to prevent the embarrassment and damage to
125. See FDA Fundamentals, U.S. FoOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucml92695.htm (last updated Aug. 29, 2011) (FDA
assures safety, effectiveness, and security of nation's food supply, cosmetics, and dietary supplements); All Departments,WAL-MART, http://www.walmart.com/catalog/catalog.gsp?cat=121828 (last visited Sept. 1, 2011) (Wal-Mart has grocery, beauty, and
diet & nutrition departments); Businesses with Employees, IRS.Gov, http://
www.irs.gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=98862,00.html (last updated May 11, 2011);
Trademark Electronic Search System, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, http://
tess2.uspto.gov (follow "Basic Word Mark Search;" search "Wal Mart;" follow
"Search Query") (last visited Sept. 1, 2011).
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reputation that the Third Circuit feared. Under the banner of "personal privacy," a corporation could have kept a large percentage of
currently available information unavailable to requests for disclosure.
Of course, each corporation would have the option; the government
agencies that must respond to any disclosure challenges would have
no such choice. A large corporation could tie up the resources of several government agencies at once, either by challenging disclosures or
by creating the threat of a challenge and forcing the agencies to check
and double check the information to be disseminated.
2.

The Third Circuit's decision also destroyed the "practical and
workable" FOIA principle.

This same hypothetical undermines the second important principle
of FOIA: the exemptions must provide practical and workable standards. In Mink, the Supreme Court emphasized the purpose of specific exemptions-to create concrete workable standards for
determining whether information should be withheld or released. 2 6
Of course, this was probably primarily for the benefit of the agencies.
The government established agencies like the FCC to accomplish
goals other than informing the public. FOIA imposes an additional
burden on these agencies. It is not logical to assume that Congress
would want this burden to be complicated as well. If the standards are
clear-cut, agencies would have little trouble disseminating the information as well as accomplishing their other tasks. Similarly, a clear
standard saves time and money for the requestor as well. Knowing in
advance that information falls under an exemption may deter a requestor from asking for the information. Finally, if the requestor and
agency disagree on the categorization of information, concrete standards provide guidance for a court to adjudicate the matter.
a. Agencies and courts would have difficulty in determining a
standard for corporateprivacy that will fulfill the practical
and workable principle.
The exemptions are intended to be workable standards to ensure
the public has speedy access to the information held by its government. However, the Third Circuit's decision burdened this process
with additional, ill-defined standards. First, because the Third Circuit
simply granted corporations the right to personal privacy without defining it, the burden would fall upon agencies to determine what fits
within the scope of a corporation's personal privacy. As discussed
above, the standards already defined for an individual's personal privacy interest do not easily translate to a corporation. Corporations
and other organizations do not have health or familial concerns. Also,
as mentioned before, corporations disseminate larger amounts of in126. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
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formation amongst the general public than the average individual
does.
Attempting to set a standard reveals the inherent problems. For
example, how would one determine the privacy interest of AT&T?
Which AT&T information would fall under the protection of this privacy? The previous discussion of shareholder reports highlights the
lack of secrecy for information that the corporation shares with its
owners. Then, there is the information disseminated only within the
corporation. But where should the courts draw the line: amongst upper management or amongst any number of employees? Once a court
draws such a line, it would apply only to AT&T and similar corporations. A smaller corporation would require a different standard; a
larger corporation yet another standard. Even after a standard of corporate privacy had been determined, agencies would be charged with
examining requested information under at least five additional standards (agency, corporation, partnership, public organization, private
organization) in addition to screening for the other exemptions. The
inclusion of associations, partnerships, and other organizations incorporates even more multifarious structures, each of which could demand a different standard. Finally, there remains the question of
whether any information shared with an AT&T customer can still
qualify for the 7(C) exemption. These are examples of questions that
the Third Circuit decision opened up for protracted debate and
litigation.
b.

Agencies and courts would also have difficulty finding a remedy
that will fulfill the "practicaland workable" principle.

Even if agencies and courts find definite standards for determining
corporate privacy, these standards do not prescribe the remedy. In
keeping with the purpose of full disclosure, the exemptions found in
§ 552 do not prohibit the entire document from being released.
Rather, the statute permits the release of nonexempt information after redacting the portions covered by the exemptions.12 7 Agencies
and courts have generally applied this by requiring names and other
identifying information to be redacted.1 28 If the individual cannot be
identified, releasing information about him cannot invade his personal
privacy because no one can connect the details to the person. Doing
the same for a corporation may be difficult if not impossible.
Much like the categories of information, there are no clear
equivalents of identifying information between individuals and corporations. While redacting a corporation's name would make identification more challenging, other details could pinpoint an identity.
Companies tend to specialize, whether in the products manufactured
127. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006).
128. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 374-75 (1976).
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or services provided. Even something as vague as a mission statement
could give the reader a hint about the identity of the company. For
example, this mission statement: "It has always been, and will always
be, about quality. We're passionate about ethically sourcing the finest
coffee beans, roasting them with great care, and improving the lives of
people who grow them. We care deeply about all of this; our work is
never done." 12 9 Though it does not contain a name, address, or anything unique to that company, one could narrow down the possibilities
to include Starbucks simply by the use of the word "coffee." In contrast, the fact that a person works at a Starbucks would not sufficiently
distinguish that individual so as to invade his personal privacy.
If preventing identification would not protect the corporation's interest, larger amounts of information would have to be redacted in
order to protect the privacy interest involved. Instead of redacting
names and releasing only generic details, agencies would have to redact the privacy-invading details themselves. Depending on the type
of details, this redaction may create gaps in the investigatory record,
which make it difficult for the public to understand how the government agency operates. For example, a government agency could investigate billing procedures and make the determination that a
company had proper procedures. But a citizen would find it difficult
to ascertain the method by which the agency made the determination
if the investigated billing information was not available, in any form,
to the public.
3.

Congress and the courts use Exemption 7(C) to protect the
unique privacy rights of individuals.

The final principle undermined was the precedent set by the courts
to use Exemption 7(C) to protect the unique privacy rights of individuals. The difficulties discussed above in determining standards for
identifying and redacting a corporation's personal information highlight the folly of using this exemption for entities other than individuals. Until the Third Circuit decision in AT&T, courts had used the
exemption only for the protection of individuals.13 0 These decisions
were based on an understanding of privacy as an individual's right to
choose how and when information about him or her is disseminated."' Though the law often uses the word "person" to denote corporations, partnerships, or other entities, this concept of privacy was
structured only around the idea of an individual's rights. A corporation does not have the same types of concealed information or the
same vulnerabilities as an individual.
129. Our Starbucks Mission Statement, STARBUCKS, http://www.starbucks.com/
about-us/company-information/mission-statement (last visited Sept. 3, 2011).
130. AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 496 (3d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1177
(2011).
131. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
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The Third Circuit's decision also raises several public
policy issues.

In addition to the practical concerns, the Third Circuit's decision
creates several public policy issues. First, corporate personal privacy
arguments against disclosure must meet a heavy burden and are unlikely to overcome the public interest in releasing information. By
granting corporations a protection that they cannot successfully wield,
the Third Circuit created the potential for inefficiency, both in the
agencies and in the courts. In Washington Post, the D.C. Circuit set
out the requirements for a party attempting to withhold information
under a FOIA exemption.13 2 The burden of proof rests on the party
who seeks to prevent disclosure.133 The D.C. Circuit framed its test in
terms of an agency attempting to withhold information; in the instant
case, AT&T, as a concerned third party, sought to prevent disclosure. 1 34 The party with the burden cannot meet it with conclusory
statements.13 5 Rather the party must show how the release of that
particular information would cause the adverse consequences that
FOIA defends against.' 3 6 As discussed above, a corporation has, at
best, tenuous arguments for the level of secrecy of its information and
for the intimate consequences of disclosure. Given the difficulty of
defining and redacting segregable portions of information, the public
interest in disclosure would likely outweigh the privacy interests of a
corporation in most instances of a FOIA request. With the balance in
favor of disclosure, this expansion of the exemption has no teeth and
would waste the time and energies of government agencies and courts.
Additionally, this is not the only statute that utilizes the definition
of the word "person" to include a corporation or other type of agency,
association, or partnership.1 3' These definitions are often used in statutes creating standing or in bankruptcy statutes. Though it failed
here, the Third Circuit's definition-based reasoning could lead to expansion in other areas typically reserved for individuals. There is a
greater risk of this in statutes that are not as well defined or consistently litigated as FOIA exemptions.

132. See Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 101 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
133. Envtl. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973); Wash. Post, 863 F.2d at
102.
134. AT&T, 582 F.3d at 493; Wash. Post, 863 F.2d at 101.
135. Wash. Post, 863 F.2d at 101.
136. Id.
137. City of Sausalito v. O'Neill, 386 F.3d 1186, 1200 (9th Cir. 2004); Constructores
Civiles de Centroamerica, S. A. v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1190 n.114 (D.C. Cir.
1972); Carolene Prods. Co. v. U.S., 140 F.2d 61, 62 (4th Cir. 1944), affd, 323 U.S. 18
(1944).
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CONCLUSION

Any given statutory scheme will not be perfect. It will have gaps,
loopholes, or redundancies. Frequent litigation can help fill in those
gaps, block the loopholes, and tidy up the redundancies. After more
than thirty years of courts applying the FOIA exemptions, one would
assume that things would be clearer than at the passage of these statutes. The FCC appeared to think so, having based its decision on judicial precedent, as well as its own precedent.' 3 8 But the Third Circuit's
decision would have the judiciary "muddy the waters" once again by
opening the door, not only to AT&T, but also to any other corporation, organization, partnership, or agency willing to make the argument. By making its decision on purely definitional bases, the Third
Circuit avoided examining why individuals no longer deserve to be
singled out from the other entities in the § 551 definition. A thorough
discussion of the notion of privacy suggests that individuals are not
just like the other entities in that definition. Individuals have privacy
interests that have no corporate equivalent, and a violation of those
interests has intimate consequences that a corporation cannot feel.
But individuals are not the only ones who do not belong. To make
any sense, the Third Circuit's holding must sit in a vacuum, separate
from its consequences. The decision does not provide a compelling
explanation of the benefits of permitting corporations this privacy interest, does not weigh the likelihood of a corporation's success under
this exemption, and does not fully consider the administrative burden
imposed. This holding would create a myriad of problems in an attempt to solve a problem that may not have existed at all. Recognizing where the Third Circuit went wrong is essential to preventing
similar decisions in the future. Courts cannot disregard the purpose of
FOA and the principles established to promote that purpose. The
Supreme Court, fortunately, overturned this decision, putting individuals and corporations back where they belong.
138. AT&T Inc. v. FCC, 582 F.3d 490, 493 (3d Cir. 2009), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 1177
(2011).
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